In the Big House with the Good Book: An Examination of the Constitutionality of Faith-Based Prisons by Semyonova, Katerina
City University of New York Law Review
Volume 8 | Issue 1
Summer 2005
In the Big House with the Good Book: An
Examination of the Constitutionality of Faith-
Based Prisons
Katerina Semyonova
CUNY School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
The CUNY Law Review is published by the Office of Library Services at the City University of New York. For more information please contact
cunylr@law.cuny.edu.
Recommended Citation
Katerina Semyonova, In the Big House with the Good Book: An Examination of the Constitutionality of Faith-Based Prisons, 8 N.Y. City L.
Rev. 209 (2005).
Available at: 10.31641/clr080105
In the Big House with the Good Book: An Examination of the
Constitutionality of Faith-Based Prisons
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Professor Ruthann Robson, Professor Jeffrey Kirchmeier, Kendra Hutchinson,
Sebastian Riccardi, and Joshua Perry for their comments and assistance.
This article is available in City University of New York Law Review: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr/vol8/iss1/6
IN THE BIG HOUSE WITH THE GOOD BOOK:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF FAITH-BASED PRISONS
Katerina Semyonova*
INTRODUCTION
On Christmas Eve 2003, Florida Governor Jeb Bush christened
Lawtey Correctional Institution (Lawtey) as the nation’s first fully
“faith-based” prison.1  Lawtey, built in 1973 about fifty miles south-
east of Jacksonville, has become the prototype for the growing
movement toward faith-based incarceration.2  Florida’s religiously-
oriented incarceration functions like President George W. Bush’s
national faith-based initiatives program in reverse.  Instead of the
state distributing funds to religious groups for providing social ser-
vices, Florida’s faith-based prison system receives the apparently
pro bono services of religious organizations as they provide an un-
precedented array of social services to prisoners.3  The benefit to
religious groups is not state funds, but rather access to the state’s
prisoners.
More than one thousand inmates are currently on the waiting
list for one of Lawtey’s eight hundred beds.4  To qualify for transfer
to Lawtey, prisoners must be within three years of release, have low-
* City University of New York School of Law, J.D. 2005.  The author would like to
thank Professor Ruthann Robson, Professor Jeffrey Kirchmeier, Kendra Hutchinson,
Sebastian Riccardi, and Joshua Perry for their comments and assistance.
1 Paul Pinkham, Bush Dedicates Nation’s First Faith-Based Prison, FLA. TIMES-UNION,
Dec. 25, 2003, available at http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/122503/
met_14389635.shtml.
2 The nation’s first faith-based prison for women opened in Tampa, Florida in the
summer of 2004. See Faith-Based Prison for Women Opens in Florida, 7 CORR. EDUC. BULL.
10 June 25, 2004.  Faith-based reform has also reached juveniles. See Megan O’Matz,
Juvenile Inmates to Get ‘Jesus Method’; Evangelical Groups to Take Entertainers on Tour of
Prisons, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 17, 2004, at B5.  In 2002, Florida’s Department of
Corrections opened six faith-based dormitories within traditional prisons.  Cary Mc-
Mullen, Partnership Launched Faith-Based Dormitories in Florida Prisons, LEDGER, June 8,
2003, at A12. Florida has also allowed 26,000 probationers to be supervised by the
Salvation Army, a Christian group. See Rob Boston, Bush’s Faith-Based Revival: President
Pushes Ahead with Religion Funding Scheme as a Way to “Save Americans one Soul at a Time,”
57 CHURCH & STATE 7 (Mar. 1, 2004).
3 Alan Cooperman, An Infusion of Religious Funds in Fla. Prisons: Church Outreach
Seeks to Rehabilitate Inmates, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2004, at A1.
4 Siobhan Morrissey, Good Faith Efforts, 3 No. 20 A.B.A. J. E. Rep. 3 (2004).
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security status, and have a clean disciplinary record.5  The program
is open to inmates of all faiths, but is overwhelmingly populated by
Christians.6  Christian churches provide most of the volunteers,
and the educational programs and spiritual activities are geared
toward “born-again” Christianity.7  Nonetheless, prison officials
make clear that inmates can abstain from any program offensive to
their own religious beliefs.8
Under Governor Bush, Florida has decreased state spending
on prisons with various cost-cutting measures such as not providing
ceiling fans and a moratorium on spending for recreational equip-
ment.9  In all, in the face of rising prison populations, the state has
cut more than $20 million from secular rehabilitation programs.10
At the same time, it has allowed churches to spend lavishly.  Faith-
based groups may sponsor dormitories at Lawtey by making an ini-
tial capital investment of $10,000 to pay for ceiling fans, musical
equipment, and bibles.11  Reverend Steve McCoy of Beaches
Chapel Church,12 confirmed that his congregation spent: “$1,163
for ceiling fans, $4,000 for musical instruments, $1,500 for a sound
system, $2,500 for computers, $500 for Bibles, $840 for books,
$2,500 for food, games, and candy,” and other sundries totaling
more than $30,000 since Lawtey opened.  Rev. McCoy and over a
hundred volunteers from Beaches Chapel Church visit Lawtey reg-
ularly to conduct bible classes, job hunting lessons, and computer
training.13
There has yet to be a legal challenge to Lawtey’s faith-based
program, perhaps because of the far superior conditions of incar-
ceration at Lawtey as opposed to traditional prisons. According to
one inmate, “[t]he difference between this and my last prison,
5 See Nation’s First Faith-Based Prison Continues to Stir Concerns, 9 CORR. PROF’L 20,
July 30, 2004; see also Pinkham, supra note 1.
6 Boston, supra note 2, at 7.
7 See generally Tim Padgett, When God Is the Warden: The Nation’s First Faith-Based
Prison Mixes Religion and Rehab — and Stirs Up Controversy, TIME, June 7, 2004, at 50.
8 See John Riley, Hoping Faith Will Stop Crime: Florida Has the Nation’s First ‘Faith-
Based’ Prison as a Trend to Use Religion in Correction Grows, NEWSDAY, May 23, 2004, at A7
(noting that all programs organized by chaplains “are offered to all inmates on a take-
it-or-not basis.”).
9 See Cooperman, supra note 4, at A1.
10 See Padgett, supra note 7, at 51.
11 Cooperman, supra note 3.
12 Rev. Steve McCoy was named the Florida Department of Corrections Volunteer
of the Year 2004. See Christopher F. Aguilar, Pastor, Congregation Honored For Example;
Church Began Faith-Based Prison Program, FLA. TIMES-UNION, July 7, 2004, at L1, available
at http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/news/article.cfm?id=1712.
13 Id.
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where I was mixed in with violent criminals, is heaven and hell.”14
Amy Fettig of the ACLU National Prison Project commented that
while faith-based prisons are “potentially problematic,” the ACLU
has not received complaints from inmates, and the organization
has chosen to “focus on other conditions like deprivation of food,
crowding, and violence.”15  This Article does not dispute that the
most grievous constitutional violations in prisons arise under the
Eighth Amendment rather than the Establishment Clause.  How-
ever, this Article addresses the constitutionality of faith-based pris-
ons under the Establishment Clause16 in the hope that the political
will to maintain faith-based prisons will force constitutional compli-
ance in the form of improving prison conditions for all prisoners
and providing secular as well as religious options for rehabilitation.
Part I of this Article reviews the Supreme Court’s Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence and presents the various tests lower
courts may employ to examine the constitutionality of faith-based
prisons.  Part II considers recent federal and state Establishment
Clause decisions arising out of the prison context and examines
the propriety of applying a lower standard to prisoners’ claims of
constitutional violations.  Part III discusses the constitutionality of
Lawtey’s particular brand of faith-based prison under the Supreme
Court’s current Establishment Clause tests.
I. SUPREME COURT’S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has
been aptly described as a “geometry of crooked lines and wavering
shapes.”17  The Court’s various tests in the area often appear poorly
defined or in danger of blending into one another.  The jurispru-
dence also leaves unclear the specific factual predicate that will call
up one particular test over another.  The difficulty of the tests may
be ascribed to problems interpreting the sparse language of the
Establishment Clause and to conflicting judicial analysis of the
broader principles underlying the Establishment Clause.18  Calls
for abandoning some of these tests have not been heeded and an
14 Padgett, supra note 7, at 51.
15 Samantha M. Shapiro, Jails for Jesus, MOTHER JONES, Nov./Dec. 2003, at 55-59.
16 The First Amendment states in pertinent part: “Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the effect of the intermittent use and transformation
of the Court’s Lemon test).
18 See Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad Princi-
ples, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489, 490-97 (2004).
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understanding of all the tests remains necessary for interpreting
the constitutionality of faith-based prisons.
A. The Lemon Test
The Court last approximated unanimity in its Establishment
Clause jurisprudence in Lemon v. Kurtzman, where for varying rea-
sons, nine justices held unconstitutional at least one provision of a
state statutory scheme that provided financial assistance to church-
affiliated schools.19  At this high water mark for coherence, while
acknowledging that they only “dimly perceive[d] the lines of de-
marcation in this extraordinary sensitive area of constitutional
law,”20 the Court prescribed a three-part test for Establishment
Clause questions.  Under the Lemon test, the constitutionality of
state action hinges on: 1) a secular legislative purpose; 2) a princi-
pal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and 3) the absence of excessive government entanglement with
religion.21
The first prong of the Lemon test rarely proves a high hurdle
for state action.22  In considering the purpose of a piece of legisla-
tion, courts are prepared to afford great deference to the legisla-
ture,23 and will not attribute unconstitutional motives to states
when a “plausible secular purpose may be discerned from the face
of the statute.”24  Thus, the brunt of the Establishment Clause anal-
ysis falls to Lemon’s second and third prongs, which consider the
legislation’s primary effect and the possibility of excessive entangle-
ment with religion.
While placing the analytical burden on these prongs, the
Lemon Court failed to articulate the type of inquiry it required.  In
response to this analytical vacuum, reasoning has emerged that at-
tempts to differentiate between legislative action that has the effect
of advancing religion and legislative action that allows religious or-
19 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
20 Id. at 612.
21 Id. at 612-13.
22 The deference afforded to state legislatures and the Court’s willingness to ac-
cept any plausible secular purpose has resulted in the vast majority of religiously-ori-
ented legislation passing the initial Lemon inquiry. But see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down a Louisiana law that required creationism to be dis-
cussed with evolution in public schools); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (find-
ing that legislation requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public
schools failed Lemon’s purpose prong).
23 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
24 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983).
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ganizations or individuals to advance religion.25  The difficult dis-
tinction requires that impermissible primary effects be perceived
by analogy to prior decisions.
The Lemon Court provided only marginally more guidance on
the excessive entanglement prong, instructing lower courts to “ex-
amine the character and purposes of the institutions that are bene-
fited, the nature of the aid that the state provides, and the resulting
relationship between the government and the religious author-
ity.”26  This guidance aside, the excessive entanglement inquiry has
focused on the amount of governmental monitoring of sectarian
institutions required to maintain the secular nature of a govern-
mental program. “[P]rophylactic contacts [typically by state admin-
istrators] will involve excessive and enduring entanglement
between state and church”27 and raise the specter of constitutional
violation.
The ambiguity of the Lemon test is most apparent from deci-
sions applying its three prongs.  The post-Lemon years are marked
by a kind of line-by-line audit of legislative action seemingly unwor-
thy of the Supreme Court.  For instance, in Wolman v. Walter, the
Court upheld a state program providing various therapeutic ser-
vices to children in non-public schools and the loaning of text-
books to religious schools, but barred state loans of instructional
equipment such as slide projectors and state funding for field
trips.28  The Court feared that “the individual teacher who makes a
field trip meaningful” might unacceptably foster religion.29  In Til-
ton v. Richardson, the Court upheld a federal funding program au-
thorized grants for the construction of secular buildings at
religious colleges, but struck a provision that allowed the building
to be used for religious purposes in the future.30  Two years later,
the Court held unconstitutional in its entirety a similar state pro-
gram that provided funds to non-public schools for building
improvements.31
Even in its good years, the Court called the Lemon test, “no
more than [a] helpful signpost” in dealing with Establishment
25 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 719 (1994)
(O’Connor, J., concurring). See also Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Latter
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336-37 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Larkin v.
Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1982).
26 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
27 Id. at  619.
28 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 230 (1977).
29 Id. at 253.
30 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
31 Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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Clause challenges.32  In later years, the Lemon test was identified as
a pariah, “a bad test [that] may drive out the good” and that con-
tinually required tinkering, “making it more and more amorphous
and distorted.”33  Justice Scalia equated the Lemon test to a “ghoul
in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried . . . .”34
This clear distaste for the Lemon test may have caused its partial
premature retirement35 and certainly spawned a proliferation of
other tests.  But Lemon’s retirement is by no means certain; it has
not been forgotten by the lower courts and the test serves as a foun-
dation for others.36
B. The Agostini Test
For all of her abhorrence of the Lemon test, Justice O’Connor’s
Agostini test retains the lamentable ambiguity that she attributed to
Lemon.  The Agostini test is little more than a mutation of Lemon,
retaining its first prong and collapsing its second and third.  The
test’s second inquiry into impermissible effect and purpose is an-
swered with reference to “three primary criteria”: 1) whether the
action or program results in governmental indoctrination; 2)
whether the program defines its recipients by reference to religion;
and 3) whether the governmental action creates excessive entan-
glement.37  The primary embellishment on Lemon is that the sec-
ond criterion focuses on the neutrality of the governmental
program and the fostering of religion through private choice.
In Agostini, the Court overruled Aguilar v. Felton38 and School
District of Grand Rapids v. Ball,39 decisions that twelve years earlier,
applying the Lemon test, found that enrichment classes provided by
state-funded employees on parochial school grounds constituted
excessive entanglement.40  The reversal was premised not only on
the new test, but on decisions since Aguilar and Ball in which the
Court shifted its understanding of the factual predicate for exces-
32 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (internal citations omitted).
33 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 720 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
34 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
35 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795 (1993).
36 For use of Lemon by the lower courts, see, e.g., Newdow v. United States Congress,
292 F.3d 597, 609-11 (9th Cir. 2002); Modrovich v. Allegheny, 385 F.3d 397, 403 (3d
Cir. 2004).
37 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-34 (1997).
38 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
39 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
40 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222.
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sive entanglement.41
By recognizing that indoctrination and entanglement are
more difficult to prove, the Agostini test focuses on the neutrality of
the government program.  The focus on neutrality allows the gov-
ernment to provide aid to sectarian and secular institutions alike as
long as the aid is provided without reference to religious criteria
and can be traced back to “true private choice” rather than govern-
mental action.42
For example, in upholding the constitutionality of Cleveland’s
school voucher program through which ninety-six percent of par-
ticipating children used state-funded vouchers to attend private re-
ligious schools, the Court found that the voucher program was
itself religiously neutral and that governmental assistance was dis-
tributed to a broad class of individuals who in turn directed govern-
ment funds to religious institutions.43  Thus, where true private
choice prevails, governmental advancement of religion is merely
“incidental” and “perceived endorsement of a religious message is
reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not the
government.”44
Further, an apparent dearth of choice does not lead to uncon-
stitutionality.  It is only constitutionally important that vouchers
provide parents with financial assistance for an array of private
schools.  No constitutional significance attaches to the majority of
program participants choosing to employ vouchers to attend relig-
ious schools, or to vouchers providing financial support sufficient
only for enrollment in lower cost religious schools, not their more
costly secular counterparts.45
C. The Endorsement Test
Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit criticized the en-
dorsement test as “requiring scrutiny more commonly associated
with interior decorators than with the judiciary.”46  However, at
first glance, the test appears to be yet another version of Lemon,
asking the familiar Lemon trilogy but expanding the effects prong
41 The Court relied in large part on Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1
(1993), which upheld the use of a state funded sign language interpreter for a student
attending a religious school.
42 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 650 (2002).
43 Id. at 653.
44 Id. at 652.
45 Id. at 688 (Souter, J., dissenting).
46 Am. Jewish Cong. v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting).
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to include an inquiry into whether government has endorsed relig-
ion.47  The test recognizes that the Establishment Clause “prohibits
[the] government from appearing to take a position on questions
of religious belief or from ‘making adherence to a religion relevant
in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.’”48
Judge Easterbrook’s dissent attacked the fact-intensive application
of the test to municipal holiday displays.49
The context of the government’s message is key in determin-
ing whether the message’s religious effect will be neutralized, for
instance where a religious painting is exhibited in a museum,50 or
heightened by the nakedness of the display.  Under this logic, a
cre`che surrounded by a frame which “like all good frames, serves
only to draw one’s attention to the message inside”51 constituted
impermissible endorsement of religion while a cre`che displayed
alongside other holiday paraphernalia including Santa Claus,
candy-striped poles, and clowns created no impermissible endorse-
ment.52  Similarly, no unconstitutional message was conveyed by an
eighteen-foot menorah standing below a Christmas tree more than
twice its size and next to a sign saluting liberty.53
The haphazard nature of the context inquiry extends to the
perception inquiry.  In order for government action to remain con-
stitutional, it must not convey a message that religious belief is in
any way relevant to standing in the political community.  While de-
ciding that constitutionality hinged on public perception, the Alle-
gheny Court failed to create a coherent methodology for testing
public perception.  Justice Blackmun favored the examination of
government messages from the perspective of the reasonable ob-
server.54  Justices O’Connor, Brennan, and Stevens would have ex-
amined government action from the perspective of an observer
familiar with the history of the nation.55  The historically sensitive
47 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
48 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989) (quoting Lynch, 465
U.S. at 687).
49 Am. Jewish Cong., 827 F.2d at 128-29.
50 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595.
51 Id. at 599.
52 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671-72.
53 In Allegheny, a plurality of the Court found no constitutional violation because
the religious symbols neutralized one another and provided for a secular celebration
of pluralism.  492 U.S. 573.
54 Id. at 620.
55 Id. at 630-31 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In her concurrence, joined by Justices
Brennan and Stevens, Justice O’Connor wrote that the “‘history and ubiquity’ of a
practice is relevant because it provides part of the context in which a reasonable ob-
server evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice conveys a message of
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observer would not be offended by governmental sponsorship of
religious practices where the practices date back to the founding.56
In a later embellishment, Justice Rehnquist credited the public ob-
server with knowledge of the challenged action’s history and con-
text.57  While the Supreme Court has to date confined the test to
municipal displays, lower courts have applied it more broadly;58
therefore, the test could be used in assessing the constitutionality
of faith-based prisons.
D. The Coercion Test
The coercion test can be traced back to 1946, when in its first
Establishment Clause case, the Supreme Court recognized that at
bottom, the Establishment Clause prohibits the state from
“forc[ing] or influenc[ing] a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or dis-
belief in any religion.”59  This limiting principle was resurrected as
a doctrinal test in Lee v. Weisman where the Court held unconstitu-
tional “civic or non-sectarian” prayers recited by a school-approved
rabbi at a public school graduation.60  The Court reasoned that
school-initiated prayer placed students in the untenable position of
choosing between joining in the prayer, maintaining a respectful
silence, or protesting.61  The pressure inherent in the choice,
though subtle and indirect, was found to be as real as any overt
compulsion.62  The Court also dismissed as formalistic the argu-
endorsement of religion.” Id.  Later, in Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,
Justice Stevens accused Justice O’Connor of requiring an “‘ultrareasonable observer’
who understands the vagaries of this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.” 515
U.S. 753, 807 (1996).
56 Justice O’Connor’s model observer would accommodate the Court’s decision in
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983), which upheld legislative prayer at the
start of the session.
57 In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 655 (2000), Justices O’Connor, Scalia,
Thomas, and Kennedy signed on to Justice Rehnquist’s opinion asserting that a rea-
sonable observer must be deemed aware of the history and context of a challenged
program.
58 Newdow v. United States Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2002) (apply-
ing the endorsement test to the pledge of allegiance); Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d
171, 189-92 (Tex. 2001) (considering the constitutionality under the endorsement
test of a religious education unit within a Texas prison).
59 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
60 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992).  The roots of the coercion test are outlined in Justice
Brennan’s concurrence in Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240
(1963).  Additionally, Justice Goldberg’s concurrence reasoned that putatively volun-
tary school prayer violated the Establishment Clause because of the inherently coer-
cive setting for school children compelled by law to attend school. Id. at 307.
61 Id. at 593.
62 Id.
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ment that attendance at graduation was voluntary, noting instead
that the importance of the event made it all but compulsory.63
Dissenting, Justice Scalia characterized the decision as creat-
ing a “boundless and boundlessly manipulable test of psychological
coercion.”64  Per Justice Scalia, religious coercion violates the Es-
tablishment Clause, but only where the coercion is “by force of law
or threat of penalty,”65 not peer pressure.
Seemingly carving out a schoolhouse niche for the coercion
test, in Santa Fe v. Doe, a solid six-member majority again applied
the test, without fragmented concurrences, to strike down student-
led prayer at high school football games.66  As in Lee, the Court was
particularly solicitous of the social pressures endured by school age
children, and found that students should not be forced to choose
between acquiescence and protest at socially important football
games.67  The Court extended Lee by finding the pre-game appeals
to divine assistance coercive despite the institution of the practice
through student elections, thereby holding that a decision by the
majority of the student body could not cleanse the coercive nature
of the invocation.68
In both Lee and Santa Fe, the Court expressed no opinion on
the applicability of the coercion test to adults.69  However, it is
clear that the baseline of the coercion test, the legal coercion test
as advocated by Justice Scalia, would apply in all Establishment
Clause cases regardless of the plaintiff’s age.  The psychological co-
ercion test may also logically apply to prisoners who face more in-
sidious coercion than adults in the general population and who, by
virtue of their confinement, have a diminished capacity to make
choices.70
63 Id. at 595.
64 Id. at 632.
65 Id. at 640.
66 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
67 See id. at 310-11.  The Court dismissed the school district’s argument that partici-
pation in extracurricular football games was voluntary and therefore distinct from
high school graduations.  “To assert that high school students do not feel immense
social pressure, or have a truly genuine desire, to be involved in the extracurricular
event that is American high school football is ‘formalistic in the extreme.’” Id. (quot-
ing Lee, 505 U.S. at 595).
68 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 304-05.
69 Lee, 505 U.S. at 593.
70 For instance, the Court distinguished legislative prayer upheld in Marsh v. Cham-
bers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), noting that legislators mill around during the prayer and
are free to come and go as they choose. Lee, 505 U.S. at 596-97.
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II. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IN PRISON
A. Prisoner Claims Stemming From Mandatory Rehabilitative Programs
with Religious Content
To date, state and federal cases considering prisoners’ Establish-
ment Clause claims have arisen primarily in the context of state
mandated Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) or Narcotics Anony-
mous (NA) programs, where prisoner participation is required
as a condition of parole or as a condition of beneficial treatment
while in prison.71  A majority of the cases considering
mandatory participation in AA have applied the coercion test in
holding the programs unconstitutional.  To implicate the Estab-
lishment Clause, however, courts must find as a preliminary mat-
ter that AA or NA programs are religious.72 Courts finding that
such programs are merely spiritual have found no Establishment
Clause violation.73
Courts that apply the coercion test to mandatory AA programs
have largely reduced the test to a three part inquiry, examining: 1)
whether the state has acted; 2) whether the action constitutes coer-
cion; and 3) whether the object of coercion is religious.74 Courts
have had little difficulty concluding that participation in religious
programs is coerced when prisoners are threatened with loss of
good-conduct credits,75 inability to earn new good-conduct cred-
its,76 higher security risk ratings,77 diminished parole eligibility,78
and decreased visitation rights.79
However, courts applying the coercion test to prison programs
where participation in a religious program is one of several means
of earning advantageous treatment have not found coercion so
71 See, e.g., Rachel F. Calabro, Correction Through Coercion: Do State Mandated Alcohol
and Drug Treatment Programs in Prisons Violate the Establishment Clause?, 47 DEPAUL L.
REV. 565 (1998).
72 For decisions finding that Alcoholics Anonymous is a religious program, see Kerr
v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996); In re Garcia, 24 P.3d 1091, 1096 (Wash. App. Div.
1 2001); Griffin v. Coughlin, 88 N.Y.2d 674 (1996).
73 Where AA programs are considered nonreligious, mandatory participation does
not offend the Establishment Clause. See Stafford v. Harrison, 766 F. Supp. 1014 (D.
Kan. 1991) (finding AA merely spiritual); Feasel v. Willis, 904 F. Supp. 582, 586 (N.D.
Tex. 1995); Jones v. Smid, No. 4-89-CV-20857, 1993 WL 719562, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Apr.
29, 1993).
74 See, e.g., Kerr, 95 F.3d 472; Nusbaum v. Terrangi, 210 F. Supp. 2d 784 (E.D. Va.
2002).
75 Nusbaum, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 785.
76 Id.; Warburton v. Underwood, 2 F. Supp. 2d 306 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
77 Kerr, 95 F.3d 472.
78 Id.
79 Griffin, 88 N.Y.2d at 677 (1996).
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long as a secular option is available to the prisoner.80  They have
instead concluded that “the absence or presence of choice is some-
times determinative in deciding whether coercion took place.”81
These courts have not considered the position of the Lee v. Weis-
man majority, and thus have failed to analyze whether choice is
truly tenable in the prison context.82  Courts have instead relied on
the lowest common denominator of the coercion test: the prohibi-
tion of legal coercion.83
Except in situations where a religious program is one among a
series of options, the coercion test is the kindest to prisoners’
claims.  Courts applying other tests such as Lemon or Agostini in the
mandatory treatment context typically find no Establishment
Clause violation.  For instance, applying the Lemon test, the North-
ern District of New York found that requiring participation in AA
for eligibility for the prison’s family reunification program fur-
thered the secular goals of reducing recidivism and abating addic-
tion.84  Participation in AA also did not have the effect of
promoting or inhibiting religion and did not create excessive en-
tanglement as participation was voluntary and the state did not
control the AA group.85
In applying Agostini to a taxpayer suit challenging the state
funding of treatment centers that provide AA programs, the West-
ern District of Wisconsin found no violation of the Establishment
Clause as a valid secular purpose supported the funding of the pro-
gram and any resulting indoctrination could not be attributed to
the state where individuals freely chose to participate.86  In a simi-
lar suit challenging state financing and encouragement of partici-
pation in AA at state-funded alcohol treatment centers, the Second
Circuit, applying Lemon-Agostini found a valid secular purpose and
that funding only indirectly, if at all, reached AA.87  Further, the
court held that state employees urging attendance at AA meetings
were sufficiently distant from the state for their actions not to be
80 See In re Garcia, 24 P.3d 1091, 1096 (Wash. App. 2001); O’Connor v. California,
855 F. Supp. 303 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
81 In re Garcia, 24 P.3d at 1096.
82 505 U.S. 577, 598.
83 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (applying a standard of
legal, actual coercion for violation of the Establishment Clause).
84 Boyd v. Coughlin, 914 F. Supp. 828, 831-32 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
85 Id. at 833.
86 Freedom From Religion Found. Inc., v. McCallum, 214 F. Supp. 2d 905, 914-20
(W.D. Wis. 2002).
87 DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 413-16 (2d Cir. 2001).
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construed as state-sponsored indoctrination.88
Despite the poor success rate of establishment claims under
Lemon and Agostini, these tests should not necessarily be fatal to
prisoners’ claims.  The difficulty stems not from the tests them-
selves but from the Court’s increasing tolerance of entanglement
and its reliance on free choice to distance support of religion from
state actors.  Further, the disparate results under the coercion,
Lemon, and Agostini tests are inconsistent with the Lemon doctrine
as “coercion exerted by the state is enough to fail the second prong
of Lemon.”89
B. Prisoner Claims Stemming From Religious Programs in Prisons
A situation distinct from mandatory participation in AA, and
most akin to Florida’s faith-based system, presented itself in Wil-
liams v. Lara90 where the Texas Supreme Court considered the con-
stitutionality of the Chaplain’s Education Unit (CEU) located at
the Tarrant County Corrections Center.  In the CEU, a Texas sher-
iff and his staff taught “orthodox Christian biblical principles” to
willing inmates who met other eligibility criteria.91  Upon chal-
lenge by nonparticipating inmates and taxpayers under the Estab-
lishment Clause, the Texas Supreme Court considered the Lemon,
coercion, and endorsement tests, and found that although the pro-
gram had the valid secular purpose of rehabilitating criminal of-
fenders, it impermissibly endorsed the religious beliefs of the
sheriff to the exclusion of all others.92 The state’s demonstrable
preference for one religious view was inconsistent with the Estab-
lishment Clause even where inmate participation in the program
was strictly voluntary.93
A pending case challenging faith-based prisons in Iowa has fo-
cused on the state’s financial support of InnerChange,94 a group
88 Id. at 416-19.
89 Nusbaum, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 788.
90 52 S.W.3d 171, 175 (Tex. 2001); see Daniel Brook, When God Goes to Prison, LEGAL
AFFAIRS, May/June 2003.
91 Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d at 176 (Tex. 2001). Prisoners spent four hours a day
learning orthodox Christian teachings and spent the rest of their time completing
bible assignments and reviewing religious books or videotapes.
92 Id. at 192.
93 Id. at 191-92.
94 InnerChange is the brainchild of Charles Colson, formal special counsel to
Richard Nixon.  He served seven months in prison after pleading guilty to obstruction
of justice in the Watergate-related Daniel Ellsberg case. See also Shapiro, supra note
16, at 57.  InnerChange is “a revolutionary, Christ-centered, Bible-based prison pro-
gram supporting prison inmates through their spiritual and moral transformation,”
available at http://www.ifiprison.org/about.shtml (last visited Dec. 15, 2004).
222 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:209
that has contracted with the state to provide prisoners with the
“choice of embracing a new life in Christ and personal transforma-
tion.”95  Since 1999, InnerChange has received approximately
$880,000 in Iowa state funds, which the group contends serves only
to support the secular aspects of its Christ-based teachings.96  In
defending the InnerChange program, the state argued that it mir-
rored other “free-choice” programs such as school vouchers.97  The
case may have implications for InnerChange programs in Texas,
Minnesota, and Kansas but may not reach faith-based programs
that are not directly financed by the state.98
C. Diminished Establishment Clause Rights for Prisoners
Professor Lynn S. Branham, one of the few scholars to make a
legal argument supporting the constitutionality of faith-based pris-
ons,99 posited that prisoners’ claims under the Establishment
Clause should be considered under the doctrine set forth in Turner
v. Safley100 and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz.101  Professor Branham
relied on Turner and O’Lone as their standards are typically fatal to
prisoners’ claims of constitutional violation.102
In Turner, the Court considered Missouri prison regulations
barring inmate-to-inmate mail and the state’s odd restrictions on
inmate marriage.  The Court held that prison regulations that im-
pinge on prisoners’ constitutional rights survive legal challenge if
they are reasonably related to the state’s penalogical objectives.103
In assessing the reasonableness of regulations, courts are to ex-
amine whether the regulation is validly and rationally connected to
its stated penalogical goal and whether any alternative means of
95 Laurie Goodstein, Group Sues Christian Program at Iowa Prison, N. Y. TIMES, Feb.
13, 2003, at A39.
96 Id.
97 Telephone interview with Alex J. Luchenitser, Litigation Counsel, Americans
United for Separation of Church and State (Jan. 27, 2004).
98 Id.
99 Lynn S. Branham, Go and Sin No More, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 291, 303 (2004).
100 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
101 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
102 Branham, supra note 99, at 304-05. See also Derek P. Apanovitch, Religion and
Rehabilitation: The Requisition of God By the State, 47 DUKE L.J. 785, 831 (1998) (“Because
Turner is essentially a rational basis test, prisoners’ Establishment Clause claims will
almost always lose when assessed under Turner.”).
103 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.  The new standard announced by Turner, signaled a
change from a “hands-off” policy toward constitutional violations in prison, to one
where the court considered prisoners’ claims, but afforded states substantial defer-
ence where prison policies arguably furthered penalogical objectives.  Matthew P. Blis-
chak, O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz: The State of Prisoners’ Religious Free Exercise Rights, 37
AM. U. L. REV. 453 (1988).
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exercising the impacted constitutional right remains open to the
prisoner.104
In O’Lone, the Court applied this test to deny Muslim prison-
ers’ claims that a new prison regulation that required that prison-
ers remain all day at their work assignments violated their rights
under the Free Exercise Clause because the regulation foreclosed
participation in Jumu’ah, a weekly congregational service held on
Friday afternoons.105  The Turner/O’Lone doctrine stresses defer-
ence to prison officials and waters down constitutional protections
for prisoners because of the special concerns of the prison environ-
ment.106  In all, the Supreme Court has applied the Turner test to
prisoners’ claims under the First Amendment’s Free Speech
Clause107 and Free Exercise Clause,108 and to Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process claims not to be involuntarily medicated,109 and
to have contact visits110 and access to the courts.111  The Supreme
Court has yet to consider prisoner claims under the Establishment
Clause.
Professor Branham argues that Turner should extend equally
to Establishment Clause claims because the clause is designed only
to protect individual religious liberty and to shelter religion from
the corrosive effects of secularism.112  By limiting the Establishment
Clause to these two anemic purposes, Professor Branham can
largely dismiss the latter as inapplicable and allow the former to
succumb to the deference that the Supreme Court has traditionally
afforded prison officials in managing inmates.  In short, there is
little danger of state meddling in religion where religious groups
have open and free access to prisoners, and the Court has already
limited prisoners’ rights in terms of their freedom to practice relig-
ion.  However, Professor Branham failed to consider the broader
104 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.
105 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 347 (1987).  In O’Lone, prisoner work
details were supervised by one guard, and when a prisoner needed to return to the
prison compound, all prisoners were obligated to return, necessitating movement
past the front gates and posing security problems.
106 See Owen J. Rarric, Kirsch v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections: Will the Supreme Court
Say “Hands Off” Again?, 35 AKRON L. REV. 305 (2002).
107 Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404 (1989) (censorship of publications
detrimental to institutional security); Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 228 (2001) (pro-
hibition on inmates providing legal advice to other inmates); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974) (limitation on media access to prisoners).
108 O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 342.
109 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990).
110 Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003).
111 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 360 (1996).
112 Branham, supra note 99, at 303.
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purposes of the Establishment Clause, which include preventing
government from endorsing religion, making religion relevant to
community standing,113 and forcing people to go to or remain
away from church.114  Professor Branham also relied on what she
optimistically calls a conflict between state and federal courts on
the application of the Turner test to Establishment Clause claims.115
The Turner/O’Lone line of reasoning makes little sense as a
barrier to Establishment Clause claims.  The Court has applied the
Turner test to claims where prisoners challenge the infringement of
an individual constitutional right. Turner is appropriate to such in-
dividual rights claims because “[l]awful incarceration brings about
the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and
rights.”116  However, when a prisoner complains of an Establish-
ment Clause violation, he does not assert an individual right to en-
gage in certain behavior, but rather a community right to be free
from the governmental imposition of religion.  Like the Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment,
Establishment Clause claims should not be subject to review that
grants broad deference to the state.117
Contrary to reason, the deferential standard of Turner would
allow cruel and unusual punishment and forced practice of relig-
ion as long the practices furthered some institutional goal.118  In a
recent case considering a prisoner’s challenge to California’s race-
based segregation policy, the Supreme Court held that “the right
not to be discriminated against based on one’s race is not subject
to the logic of Turner.”119  Thus, the deferential standard in Turner
applies “only to rights that are inconsistent with proper
incarceration.”120
113 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 573, 594 (1989).
114 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
115 Branham, supra note 99, at 304 n.79.  (“The lower courts are currently divided
on the question whether the Turner test applies to prisoners’ Establishment Clause
claims.  Some courts have held that the Turner test applies to such claims.”) (citing
Howard v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 1019, 1025 (D. Colo. 1994) (as applying the
Turner test)); Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 188 (Tex. 2001) (not applying the
Turner test); Scarpino v. Grosshiem, 852 F. Supp. 798 (S.D. Iowa 1994) (adopting a
middle-of-the-road approach).
116 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
117 Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2004); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189,
193-94 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he full protections of the Eighth Amendment most cer-
tainly remain in force [in prison].).
118 Under the logic of Turner, a reduced rate of recidivism in participants in relig-
iously oriented incarceration programs could warrant forced religious practice in
penitentiaries.
119 Johnson v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1149 (2005).
120 Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Further, courts considering prisoners’ Establishment Clause
claims have largely found the Turner test inapplicable.121  Cases
that Professor Branham relies on as evincing a circuit split are in-
stead cases where an inmate asserts a free exercise claim, for exam-
ple complaining that prison officials denied him space to perform
satanic rituals,122 and the inmate tacks on an Establishment Clause
claim stemming from the same action.  The state of the case law on
prisoners’ claims challenging the establishment of religion cannot
properly be called a split.  One court noted that virtually every
court that has considered Establishment Clause challenges has
done so without relying on Turner.123  The conclusion that the Tur-
ner test should not be applied to Establishment Clause claims may
also be driven by the fact that the Turner test itself is largely nonsen-
sical in the Establishment Clause context.  The second prong of
the Turner test, whether any means of exercising the impacted con-
stitutional right remain open to the prisoner, cannot be answered
with respect to an  Establishment Clause inquiry where a prisoner
asserts that the government has coerced him into practicing relig-
ion, or has endorsed one religion over another or religion
generally.
Lastly, the deferential standard of Turner and O’Lone serves to
insulate the “day-to-day judgments of prison officials” from search-
ing review by a judiciary far removed from the realities of prison
life.124  Regulations and judgments regarding prison security “are
particularly within the province and professional expertise of cor-
rections officials” and “courts should ordinarily defer to their ex-
pert judgment in such matters.”125  Application of this deferential
121 See, e.g., Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 476-80 (7th Cir.1996) (analyzing an Estab-
lishment Clause claim without applying Turner); Muhammad v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of
Corr., 904 F.Supp. 161, 195-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying Turner to Free Exercise
claims but not to Establishment Clause claims stemming from the jail’s refusal to pro-
vide inmates with Nation of Islam ministers and services); Scarpino v. Grosshiem, 852
F. Supp. 798, 804 (S.D. Iowa 1994) (rejecting the Turner test in a case challenging a
religious rehabilitation program in prison and noting that “when accommodation is-
sues do not arise, Establishment Clause rights are not rights which ‘may necessarily be
limited due to the unique circumstances of imprisonment’”).
122 Howard v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (D. Colo. 1994).  Howard
argued that he was unfairly denied space to conduct satanic rituals.  Applying the
Turner test, the court found that in light of the prison’s accommodation of other
inmate religious practices, its refusal was largely pretextual and unrelated to penalogi-
cal objectives. Id. at 1029-30.
123 See Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 188 (“Since Turner was decided, an overwhelming ma-
jority of the courts that have considered an inmate’s Establishment Clause challenge
have declined to apply Turner in assessing the constitutionality of a prison’s actions.”).
124 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
125 Id. at 86.
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standard has been limited to spot judgments of corrections person-
nel and to regulations promulgated by specific agencies to which
state legislatures have delegated authority to manage and control
prisons.126  In Florida, where the decision to maintain faith-based
units is made by a legislative body far removed from the realities of
“day-to-day” prison administration, the case for deference to prison
experts is much less compelling.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWTEY
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
A. Lawtey Correctional Institute’s Avoidance of Clear Constitutional
Violation
Cognizant of the potential for Establishment Clause violation,
the Florida legislature and Governor Bush crafted Lawtey in a man-
ner that avoided some of the minefields of the Court’s Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence.  Lawtey’s secular goals of reducing
recidivism by helping inmates assume personal responsibility and
adjust to incarceration are provided by statute.127  Lawtey employ-
ees are called on to “[d]evelop community linkages with churches,
synagogues, mosques, and other faith-based institutions,”128 but do
not themselves minister to inmates.  The arrangement avoids the
unconstitutionality of Texas’s Williams v. Lara, where Sheriff Wil-
liams preached Christianity to a self-selected group of prisoners.129
Lawtey’s use of volunteers also circumvents the problems of exces-
sive monitoring and direct subsidies to religious groups.
Further, Lawtey espouses the language of neutrality and free
choice characteristic of the Court’s recent jurisprudence.130
Lawtey is open to all inmates regardless of their personal religious
126 Turner, 482 U.S. at 81 (applying deference to regulations promulgated by the
Missouri Division of Corrections); O’Lone, 482 U.S. 342, 344 (applying deference to
prison officials’ implementation of New Jersey Department of Corrections Standard
853); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 214-15 (applying deference to Washing-
ton’s Special Offender Center Policy 600.30 regarding involuntary medication); Lewis
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (applying deferential review to Arizona Department of
Corrections’ personnel regarding access to the prison’s legal library and legal
assistance).
127 FLA. STAT. ANN § 944.803(1) (West 2001).
128 Id. § 944.803(2)(c).  “It is the intent of the legislature that the Department of
Corrections and the private vendors operating private correctional facilities shall con-
tinuously: . . . develop community linkages with churches, synagogues, mosques, and
other faith-based institutions to assist inmates in their release back into the commu-
nity . . .  .” Id.
129 See supra Part II.B.
130 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2000).
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beliefs.  Selection criteria are apparently neutral: the prison relies
on security status, infractions while in prison, and release date.131
Like Cleveland’s voucher program, Lawtey is accessible to all eligi-
ble inmates, subject to space limitations, who choose to pass their
incarceration in the facility.  Lawtey also nominally accepts the par-
ticipation of a wide array of faith-based groups in providing relig-
ious and educational services to inmates.132  Relying on the Court’s
emphasis on neutrality,133 Florida legislators could conclude that it
is immaterial that the vast majority of participating religious groups
and inmates are Christian,134 and that the appearance of endorse-
ment or entanglement is diluted through the free choice of in-
mates and volunteers.
Lawtey’s approach to avoiding unconstitutionality is largely
formalistic.  It mixes pieces of doctrine that best suit it without ad-
dressing concerns stemming from possible coercion of inmates
and endorsement in an institutional context where true free choice
cannot really exist.  Lawtey’s greatest insulation from constitutional
challenge is its novelty.  It creates an Establishment Clause issue in
a new setting with the twist of using volunteers rather than state
employees for the lion’s share of the theological work.  Americans
United for Separation of Church and State has taken a traditional
tack in exploring Lawtey’s constitutionality by filing public records
act requests for funding information that could reveal problems of
direct sponsorship of religious programs.135  Even in the absence of
direct financial entanglement, the faith-based program is suscepti-
ble to a finding of constitutional violation under the Supreme
Court’s prevailing tests.
B. Examining the Constitutionality of Lawtey Correctional Institute
A district court confronted with a challenge to Lawtey will
likely apply all of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause tests.
However, if prisoners present a clear claim that the state is forcing
them to participate in religious programs under the threat of
meaningful penalties, the coercion test is most appropriate to their
131 Nation’s First Faith-Based Prison Continues to Stir Concerns, 9 CORR. PROF’L 20, July
30, 2004.
132 See supra notes 6-10.
133 See supra Part I.B.
134 John Riley, Hoping Faith Will Stop Crime, NEWSDAY, May 23, 2004, at A28-29 (not-
ing that the “vast majority” of Lawtey’s volunteers are Christian and noting a predomi-
nately Christian inmate population).
135 See Americans United Files Request For Public Records On New “Faith-Based”
Prison In Florida, at http://www.au.org/site/News2?page=newsArticle&id=5977&
abbr=pr&news_iv_ ctrl=1362 (last visited Apr. 18, 2004).
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claims.  The coercion test is a logical point of departure as other
tests rely in large part on true independent choice to dispose of
claims of entanglement and endorsement.
1. Application of the Coercion Test to Lawtey
Analysis of Lawtey’s faith-based program should mirror that of
mandatory AA and NA programs.  Courts should examine: 1)
whether the state has acted; 2) whether the action amounts to coer-
cion; and 3) whether the object of the coercion is secular or relig-
ious.136  Florida has acted in creating a prison system that allows
religious institutions a monopoly on the provision of rehabilitation
services.  Rehabilitation is offered at Florida state prisons by relig-
ious organizations to whom the state has awarded access to prison-
ers.  It is irrelevant that the promoters of rehabilitation through
religion are not employed by the state, as state employees need not
minister to inmates in order to satisfy the threshold requirement of
state action.137
The difference between Florida’s traditional prisons and its
faith-based facilities sufficiently demonstrates that the putative
choice to transfer to a faith-based facility is coercive.  It makes little
difference in the outcome of the coercion analysis whether Florida
actually obliges prisoners to attend faith-based facilities or makes
transfer to faith-based facilities a condition of better treatment.
Prisoners in Florida can either transfer to Lawtey where they are
offered fans, a variety of religious and non-religious classes, and a
safer prison environment, or remain in a standard Florida peniten-
tiary without fans, outside mentors, or secular readjustment clas-
ses.138  The difference between these options could not be more
stark.  Temperatures in central Florida facilities without fans or air
conditioning frequently reach 100 degrees.139  Faith-based dormi-
tories also tend to be less crowded and populated by “better” in-
mates because inmates are chosen in part for their good behavior
in prison.  Inmates in the faith-based dormitory near Tallahassee
receive nightly classes in religion, job skills, literacy, and drug reha-
bilitation, while the prisoners in the adjacent prison at Wakulla
136 See discussion supra Section II.A.
137 See, e.g., Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The fact that NA ran
the treatment program is of no moment, since it is clear that the prison officials re-
quired inmates to attend NA meetings.”).
138 See supra Introduction.
139 See Chandler v. Crosby, No. 03-012017, 379 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 2004);
Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir. 2004) (evaluating effect of temperatures in
unairconditioned death row unit in the Mississippi delta).
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Correctional Institution enjoy no evening activities whatsoever.140
In the same sense that an inmate has no real choice between
attending AA or NA programs and opting for diminished visitation
rights and parole possibilities,141 prisoners cannot be expected to
freely elect prison conditions that are more violent, materially in-
ferior, and lacking in opportunities to learn skills that are useful
upon release.  No comparable secular alternative to faith-based
prisons exists in Florida since the state has “slashed spending” for
secular rehabilitation and job training programs.142  Inmates in
Florida have but one option if they want education and better liv-
ing conditions: faith-based prisons.  Where conditions of confine-
ment vary, to the degree that residence in a faith-based prison
amounts to a lighter sentence, the state has coerced inmates into
“choosing” religion over non-religion.
Less severe “choices” have been recognized as psychologically
coercive by the Supreme Court.  Prayer at high school graduations,
which are “in a fair and real sense obligatory,” puts students in the
untenable and coercive position of saying the prayer, maintaining
a respectful silence, or protesting.143  Similarly, pre-game prayer at
football games unconstitutionally makes submission to public
prayer a prerequisite to a popular high school social activity.144
Consideration of psychological coercion in addition to legal coer-
cion may properly be extended from schoolhouses to prisons be-
cause of the nature of the prison environment.
Florida will not be able to seriously dispute the religious na-
ture of its faith-based prisons.  While prisoners are not forced to
attend religious activities contrary to their beliefs, they are en-
couraged to participate in the predominately Christian environ-
ment.145  Inmates at Lawtey, like others across the state, perform
manual labor during the morning, but unlike other inmates, in-
140 Thomas B. Pfankuch, Faith-Based Prison Dorms, Programs Raise Questions, FLA.
TIMES-UNION, Apr. 29, 2002, at B1.
141 See supra Section II.A.
142 See Cooperman, supra note 3, at A6.
143 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992).
144 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000) (“Even if we regard
every high school student’s decision to attend a home football game as purely volun-
tary, we are nevertheless persuaded that the delivery of a pre-game prayer has the
improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of religious
worship.”).
145 See Cooperman, supra note 3, at A6.  Critiquing the faith-based prison, an in-
mate described Lawtey as “under Christian dictatorship” and a professor noted the
unconstitutional implications of faith-based prisons, which essentially require
“giv[ing] your life to Jesus Christ, our Lord, and savior” in exchange for a more com-
fortable prison atmosphere.
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mates at Lawtey spend their afternoons and evenings participating
in spiritual and secular study led by church volunteers.146  Attend-
ance at a weekly community night, which includes chaplain-led
spiritual testimonials, is mandatory.147  On Friday nights prisoners
may participate in a program called Evangelical Explosion, which is
geared toward teaching inmates how to convert others to Christian-
ity.148  Evangelical Explosion may also be combined with a church-
sponsored pizza party.149  The atmosphere is one in which religion
of one kind or another permeates all facets of incarcerated life.
2. Application of the Lemon and Agostini Tests to Lawtey
Under the Lemon and Agostini tests, the Florida Attorney Gen-
eral will have little difficulty demonstrating a secular purpose in
rehabilitating prisoners and reducing recidivism.  Since courts are
disinclined to engage in an exploration of legislative purpose, they
likely will not get to the bottom of how the purpose of reducing
recidivism can be a genuine goal when programs geared toward
that end have been eliminated in prisons housing the vast majority
of the state’s prisoners.150  In considering whether the principal or
primary purpose of the program seeks to advance religion, chal-
lengers of faith-based programs will also have to contend with pre-
cedent that has allowed public funds in the form of vouchers to
sponsor admission to predominately sectarian elementary schools.
Thus, the thrust of any argument on the unconstitutionality of
faith-based prisons will have to address Lemon’s third prong: exces-
sive entanglement.
In a pre-cursor to Lemon, the Court found an impermissible
relationship between church and state at public elementary schools
in a situation that mirrored Lawtey.  In McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a pro-
gram that excused willing public school students from class for
thirty to forty-five minutes a week for religious instruction adminis-
tered by Catholic and Protestant clergy in school classrooms.151
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Florida has more than 81,000 prisoners. See Florida Department of Corrections,
available at http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/0304/stats/im_pop.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 18, 2005).  Only 800 men are housed at Lawtey Correctional Institute. See
supra notes 2-4.  Approximately 300 women will be housed at Hillsborough Correc-
tional Institute, a faith-based prison for women. See supra note 2, Faith-Based Prison for
Women Opens in Florida.
151 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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Students whose parents elected not to enroll their children in relig-
ious classes were sent to another room to continue their secular
instruction.152  The Court found unacceptable the “close coopera-
tion” between church authorities and the state, as well as the pro-
gram’s utilization of a tax-established and tax-supported school
system to allow religious groups to spread their faith.153  Like
Lawtey, the school program functioned through the use of volun-
teers, without the apparent direct financial assistance of the
state.154  Instead, the religious program relied on the existing
school infrastructure and students’ legal obligation to attend
school to provide willing students with religious instruction.155
The degree of entanglement fostered at Lawtey is indistin-
guishable.  Lawtey also impermissibly entangles church and state
through state solicitation of religious organizations for participa-
tion in the faith-based program.156  The embellishments on Lemon
through the Agostini test provide little assistance for the state.
While Lawtey may be termed a neutral program that does not iden-
tify participants on the basis of religion, the coercive nature of the
program forecloses the possibility that any incidental aid accruing
to religions is the product of free individual choice.
3. Application of the Endorsement Test to Lawtey
Under the endorsement test, the relevant context of Florida’s
faith-based prisons is the legislative decision to defund secular re-
habilitation programs in favor of the faith-based model.  Thus, the
context is not analogous to a menorah standing next to a Christ-
mas tree and a sign saluting liberty because Florida has presented
faith-based programs as the sole state-approved method of rehabili-
tating prisoners.  It is of little import that faith-based programs, at
least nominally, provide prisoners with access to volunteers of vari-
ous faiths as the context remains pervasively religious rather than
secular.
Within this context, the state conveys the message that religion
is relevant to standing in the community by demonstrating that
only those who choose to transfer to faith-based dormitories are
worthy of the state’s rehabilitative efforts.  Prisoners who do not
apply or fail to qualify for transfer, or are simply on Lawtey’s long
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waiting list, are warehoused in prisons that lack fans, volunteers,
and vocational classes.157  The qualities that the court may attribute
to its reasonable observer are immaterial to the overall finding of
endorsement in the faith-based prison setting.  As faith-based pris-
ons are a relatively new phenomenon,158 prior acquiescence to the
practice is irrelevant to the perception of the reasonable observer.
The reasonable observer also cannot attribute perceived state en-
dorsement of religion to the private choice of prisoners as no true
choice can be made by prisoners in this context.
CONCLUSION
The only constitutional way to maintain popular faith-based
prisons is to provide inmates at ordinary state facilities the same
access to rehabilitative programs, community volunteers, and im-
proved prison conditions as enjoyed by prisoners at faith-based fa-
cilities.  State administrators responsible for reaching out to
religious communities for volunteers159 should similarly recruit sec-
ular volunteers.  The provision of an equally attractive alternative
to faith-based incarceration would circumvent the problems of co-
ercion that exist when the state provides only one religiously in-
fused option for improved conditions of confinement.  A secular
alternative to faith-based incarceration would also alleviate the
problems of entanglement and endorsement because where com-
parable secular alternatives truly exist, any perceived endorsement
of religion can be attributed to the individual prisoner rather than
to the state.
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